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Wallman: Employees' Admissions

EMPLOYEES' ADMISSIONS IN NEW YORK:
TIME FOR A CHANGE
INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: A truck driver for X
corporation gets into an accident. Shortly thereafter, the driver
tells a police officer that the brakes in his vehicle have given him
nothing but trouble and that the company's mechanic never fixed
them. In a subsequent action against X company, the police
officer seeks to testify to what the driver told him. In New York,
this testimony would be inadmissible hearsay, since the driver
had no authority to speak for the corporation. However, under
federal law, the statement would be received as an admission by
the driver, since the operation of the truck is a matter concerning
the scope of the driver's employment. Part I of this Comment
will trace the origins of the common law speaking authority rule
as applied in New York. Part II will explore the relaxation of the
speaking authority rule under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D). This Comment will conclude by arguing that New
York should adopt the federal rule.

I. EMPLOYEES' ADMISSIONS IN NEW YORK
A. General Rule: Common Law Speaking Authority
Under current New York law, "the hearsay statement of an
agent is admissible against his employer under the admissions
exception to the hearsay rule only if the making of the statement
is an activity within the scope of his authority."' New York thus
adopts the traditional common law rule that the extra-judicial
statements of an agent can be received against the principal only
if the agent has what is often called "speaking authority." These
"speaking agents" have the authority to bind the principal "ina
1. Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1041, 448 N.E.2d
1351, 1352, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (1983).
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legal evidentiary sense." ' 2 A speaking agent's authority may
include an admission of the principal's liability for injury to
3
others "if the agent's responsibility extends that far."
Since the authority to do an act does not always carry with it
the authority to speak about it, 4 the agent must have the authority
to make binding statements on behalf of the principal in order for
his statements to be deemed admissible. Additionally, the
proponent must prove that the out-of-court statement was made
during the continuance of the agency. 5 Where proof of
6
employment is absent, the statement will not be admitted.
2. Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 252 (D. Kan. 1988).
3. Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 203, 206,
225 N.E.2d 527, 529, 278 N.Y.S.2d 826, 829 (1967). Although New York's
evidentiary rule permitting statements made by agents possessing "speaking
authority" is most commonly applied in civil cases, it is equally applicable in
the criminal context. People v. Rivera, 58 A.D.2d 147, 148, 396 N.Y.S.2d
26, 28 (1st Dep't 1977). Statements made by attorneys, acting in their capacity
as agents, in open court, have thus been held admissible against the defendant
under the traditional common law rule, as well as the well settled principles of
evidence. See, e.g., Yannon v. RCA Corp, 100 A.D.2d 966, 475 N.Y.S.2d
107 (2d Dep't 1984); Bellino v. Bellino, 75 A.D.2d 630, 427 N.Y.S.2d 630
(2d Dep't 1980); People v. Rivera, 58 A.D.2d 147, 396 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1st
Dep't 1977).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 288(2) (1957) ("Authority
to do an act or to conduct a transaction does not itself include authority to
make statements concerning the transaction."); see also Weldner v,Whitman,
18 A.D.2d 765, 235 N.Y.S.2d 103 (4th Dep't 1962) (holding that "the
question is one of agency; an employee's status as an agent must be shown
before his statements would be binding upon his employer"); Schner v.
Simpson, 286 A.D. 716, 146 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1st Dep't 1955) (holding that "the
agent's authority to ... make admissions or declarations must first be
shown ... the stated admission was not admissible solely on proof of
employment").
5. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267, at 788 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
3d ed. 1984) ("[Wlhile the employment continues, the employee is not likely
to make statements unless they are true."); see also Nokolny v. Painter, 653
F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Savage Truck Line, 121 F.
Supp. 417, 418 (D. D.C. 1954); Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 86 A.D.2d
624, 627-28, 446 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (lst Dep't 1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1040,
448 N.E.2d 1351, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y.. 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448
N.E.2d 1351, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983); Kelly v.Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl
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However, the agent's out-of-court statements may not be used
as evidence of the existence of the agency relationship or his
authority. According to Wigmore, "the fact of agency
must ... be somehow evidenced before the alleged agent's
declarationscan be received as admissions.... [T]he use of the
alleged agent's hearsay assertions that he is an agent would for
7
that purpose be inadmissible, as begging the very question."
For example, in Vangersky v. Moogan,8 the plaintiff sought to
introduce the out-of-court testimony of the employee of a
veterinarian in order to show that the employee was on an
emergency call on behalf of a sick dog when the accident
occurred. 9 The Appellate Division, Second Department held that
the employee's extrajudicial statement "was not admissible
[against the employer] under the admissions exception ... for
the purpose of establishing that [the employee] was performing a
duty owed to his employer at the time of the accident." 10
The determination of what is considered within the scope of
authority is governed by the laws of agency rather than by the
laws of evidence. 11 Section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency limits the admissibility of an agent's 12 statements to
A. Morse, 35 N.Y.2d 1, 315 N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974); Kelleher
v. F.M.E. Auto Leasing Corp., 192 A.D.2d 581, 596 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dep't

1993); McNerney v. New York Polyclinic Hosp., 18 A.D.2d 210, 238
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1st Dep't 1963).
7. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 1078, at 176 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1972). See Boston Old Colony v.
Trivedi, 93 Misc. 2d 566, 403 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
8. 128 A.D.2d 699, 513 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1987).

9. Id. at 700, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
10. Id.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1957). Section 286 states:
In an action between the principal and a third person, statements of an
agent to a third person are admissible in evidence against the principal
to prove the truth of facts asserted in them as though made by the

principal, if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was
authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, any statements concerning
the subject matter.
Id.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). Section one defines

an agent as follows:
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those "concerning matters upon which the agent is authorized to
speak." 13 Moreover, the question of an agent's authority to make
declarations is a factual determination to be made at trial. 14
Whether or not someone is deemed a "speaking agent" will
also depend on the situation. For example, the out-of-court
declaration of a corporate officer acting in his official capacity
can be received against the corporation. 15 In a partnership, the
statements of one partner regarding the partnership may be
received in evidence as admissions against the other partner. 16
However, the fact that a couple is married does not by itself
make each spouse the agent of the other. 17
The law in New York is especially vague regarding the
authority of managers and supervisors to speak for their
principals. Part of the confusion is caused by the use of the term
res gestae. 18
For example, in Golden v. Horn & Hardart,19 the plaintiff
slipped and fell while entering a restaurant. At trial, the plaintiff
testified that, after the accident, the assistant manager said to the
busboy, "I thought I told you to take care of those stairs." 20
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom the action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
Id.
13.
14.
15.
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286 cmt. B (1957).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1957).
See, e.g., Fox v. Manchester, 183 N.Y. 141, 75 N.E. 1116 (1905).
See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 22 (McKinney 1988) ("An admission

or representation made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within the
scope of his authority as conferred by this chapter is evidence against the
partnership.").
17. See Le Long v. Seibrecht, 196 A.D. 74, 75-76, 187 N.Y.S. 150, 152
(2d Dep't 1921) (holding that neither the relationship of husband and wife nor
the fact that husband acted as wife's agent in sale of property was sufficient to
establish that husband had authority to write letter to wife's attorney),
18. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
19. 244 A.D. 92, 278 N.Y.S. 385 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 544,
200 N.E. 309 (1936).
20. Id. at 93, 278 N.Y.S. at 386.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/14

4

Wallman: Employees' Admissions

EMPLOYEES' ADMISSIONS

1994]

235

However, the appellate division held that the assistant manager's
statement was inadmissible since it was neither part of the res
gestae, nor was it made within the scope of his authority to bind
21
the principal.
Yet, it is difficult to reconcile the holding in Golden with the
later cases of Bransfield v. Grand Union Co. ,22 and Brusca v. El
Al Israel Airlines.23 In Bransfield, the plaintiff was permitted to
testify that shortly after she fell, the manager said to a clerk that
he thought he told him to clean up a broken egg. 24 The court of
appeals affirmed without opinion. 25 In Brusca, the Appellate
Division, Second Department held that the statement of a job
superintendent was admissible since it was within the scope of his
authority "to inspect the job site to make certain that it was in
26
safe condition."
The "speaking agent" rule was most recently affirmed in
Loschiavo v. Port Authority of New York, 27 in which the New
York Court of Appeals refused to change this "widely criticized
rule." 2 8 In so doing, the court of appeals declined Judge Lazer's
invitation to remedy the problems caused by strict adherence to
the "speaking authority" doctrine. 29 Instead, the court preferred
21.
22.
23.
24.
981.

Id. at 94, 278 N.Y.S. at 387.
17 N.Y.2d 474, 214 N.E.2d 161, 266 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1965).
75 A.D.2d 798, 427 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dep't 1983).
Bransfield, 17 N.Y.2d at 474, 214 N.E.2d at 161, 266 N.Y.S.2d at

25. Id.
26. Brusca, 75 A.D.2d at 800, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
27. 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 440 (1983).
28. Id.
29. In the appellate division case of Loschiavo, Judge Lazer in his
dissenting opinion wrote:

Bransfieki, Brusca and Golden... demonstrate the inherent incongruity
of basing admissibility on the scope of an agent's authority to speak.
Agents are rarely employed to make damaging statements on behalf of
their employers, and judicial efforts to authorize the admission of such
statements while pretending adherence to the outmoded traditional
stricture constitute an intellectually unacceptable method of joining the
modem rule to the constraints of stare decisis.
86 A.D.2d 624, 628, 446 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (2d Dep't 1982) (Lazer, J.,
dissenting).
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to leave the matter in the hands of the state legislature which was
contemporaneously considering a modification of the hearsay
rule.30

In contrast to the above situations, an agent's report to his
employer can be received against the principal even if the report
is not based on personal knowledge. 3 1 Thus, "an admission by a

party or the party's agent is receivable even though it was
derived wholly from hearsay."

32

B. Res Gestae

If agency or authority cannot be shown, the statement may still
be admissible under another hearsay exception. 33 This rule has
30. The 1983 Proposed Code of Evidence evolved from a draft form of
1981. In 1982, it was offered to the legislature where it was referred to codes
committees to be considered. In 1983, the Senate and Assembly codes and
Judiciary Committees held joint hearings and revisions were made through
1984. In 1985, it was introduced to the Senate and Assembly and remained
there until 1988. In 1989, a new draft seeking to codify current law rather than
change it, was reviewed and then, in 1990, with revisions, was submitted to
legislature. It was redrafted again after public hearings, and resubmitted to the
Governor in 1991. In the 1991-92 session of the legislature it was stated again
in the Assembly Codes Committee. See generally Barbara C. Salken, To
Codify or not to Codify-That Is the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992). See also C.
Raymond Radigan, Judicial Section Opposes Proposed Evidence Code, 205
N.Y. L.J. 44 (Jan. 23, 1991); Let's Think Before We Leap: Why Should the
Law of Evidence Be Codified?, 207 N.Y. L.J. 1 (May 13, 1992).
31. See Georges v. American Export Lines, 77 A.D.2d 26, 33, 432
N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (Ist Dep't 1980); Brusca v. El Al Airlines, 75 A.D.2d
798, 800, 427 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (2d Dep't 1980) ("The law does not
distinguish for the purpose of admissibility and relevancy between hearsay
statements based on knowledge and hearsay statements based on other
hearsay."); Cianci v. Board of Educ., 18 A.D.2d 930, 238 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550
(2d Dep't 1963) (holding that admissions made by an employer's authorized
agent were admissible against the principal notwithstanding the agent's lack of
personal knowledge). But see 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(C) 11], at 277-80 (4th ed. 1985).
32. Georges, 77 A.D.2d at 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
33. Section 289 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states: "Evidence
of statements of agents, whether or not such statements are authorized, is
admissible in favor of and against the principal, if admissible under the general
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often led courts to consider, especially in personal injury cases,
the question of whether the statement constitutes part of the res
gestae. In Latin, res gestae literally means "things done."34
However, its use in legal texts seems to defy definition 35 and has
been criticized by many commentators. 36
The drafters of the federal rules wisely eliminated the term res
gestae in favor of creating separate and distinct exceptions to the
rule against hearsay. 37
In sharp contrast to the federal law, the New York courts do
not effectively distinguish the several hearsay exceptions in this

area.

Rather,

statements

accompanying

relevant

acts, 38

rules of evidence as to the admissibility of such statements by persons not

agents."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§

289 (1957).

34. BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
35. See Williams v. Melton, 568 F. Supp. 104, 107 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
("The difficulty of formulating a description of the res gestae [sic] which will
serve for all cases, seems insurmountable.").
36. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 288 n.6, at 836 ("The
marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and
the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate
terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with
the admissibility of evidence as 'res gestae.'" (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, A
Suggested Classificationof UtterancesAdmissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J.
229 (1922))).
37. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (present sense impressions); FED. R. EVID.
803(2) (excited utterances); FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition); FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (statements for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment). While some federal judges will
occasionally use the disfavored phrase "res gestae," the Third Circuit in Miller
v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985), declared that as far as federal courts
are concerned, "'res gestae' is no longer part of the law of evidence." Id. at
509.
38. See, e.g., Hine v. New York Elevated R.R. Co., 149 N.Y. 154, 162
(1896).
When the act or transaction is itself admissible, statements or
declarations of the party at the time, calculated to explain and elucidate
the character and quality of the act and so connected with it as to
constitute one transaction, and so as to derive credit from the act itself,
are admissible as part of the res gestae.
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statements of pain and suffering, 39 declarations of state of
mind, 40 spontaneous declarations,41 and agents' statements 4 2
have all been defined as part of the nebulous res gestae exception
to the rule against hearsay.
For example, in Schner v. Simpson,4 3 the plaintiff collided with
one of the defendant company's employees and was seriously

injured when she fell to the ground. At trial, Mrs. Schner
testified that the employee said to her, "I'm sorry I knocked you
down, but I think you will be able to get up." On appeal, the

employee's statement was not considered an admission, since
39. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Rochester City & Brighton R.R. Co., 130 N.Y.
654, 656, 29 N.E. 141, 143 (1891) ("Evidence of exclamations which are
natural concomitants
and manifestations
of pain and suffering
are ... admissible ....
Unless such complaints form a part of the res gestae
they cannot be admitted.").
40. See, e.g., Matter of Putnam, 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 140 (1931)
(holding that testimony of testatrix's feelings towards her attorney can be
admitted to show state of mind, but not to prove the facts asserted),
41. See, e.g., Swensson v. New York Albany Despatch Co., 309 N.Y.
497, 131 N.E.2d 902 (1956). In Swensson, the court of appeals held that a
driver's statement that his brakes did not work was admissible as a spontaneous
declaration. The court further held that the statement was part of the res
gestae, since he "made the spontaneous statement in the course of, and within
ten seconds of the final happening of, the startling event, and was made before
he had either the time, opportunity or inclination to fabricate." Id. at 503-04.
The spontaneous declarations exception to the rule against hearsay is also
referred to as "excited utterances."; see People v. Davis, 610 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d
Dep't 1994) (holding that victim's statements, made fifteen minutes after he
was shot, were admissible as excited utterances since he was still under the
stress of the shooting); see also Schner v. Simpson, 286 A.D. 716, 146
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1st Dep't 1955). The court of appeals in People v. Brown, 80
N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993), recently expanded
the scope of admissible statements by recognizing the "present sense
impression" exception to the rule against hearsay. Under this exception,
"spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously
with the observations are admissible if the descriptions are sufficiently
corroborated by other evidence." Id. at 734, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d
at 700. In so holding, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument
that "spontaneity and contemporaneity, without stress of nervous excitement,
do not produce the requisite reliability." Id.
42. See, e.g., Luby v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 17 N.Y. 131 (1858).
43. 286 A.D. 716, 146 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1st Dep't 1955).
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"there was no proof that the employee had authority to bind his
employer. " 44 As to whether the statement was part of the res

gestae, the court held that it was not admissible because it was
not a verbal act, but rather a statement made by an agent who had
no authority to make confessions.

Specifically, the court in Schner held that the statement was not
admissible under the spontaneous exclamation exception to the
hearsay rule, 4 5 since it was considered to be an apology and an

expression of opinion 46 rather than an exclamation. Yet this
holding seems to beg several questions. How does one tell the
difference between an opinion and an exclamation? What if

someone exclaims an opinion? How much time must pass before
the statement is no longer spontaneous? Rather than attempting to

answer these questions, it would be far better to concentrate on
the agent's authority to make the statement in question.
Additionally, expanding the admissions exception to statements
concerning matters within the scope of employment will avoid
courts having to stretch the limits of the speaking agent rule in

order to obtain a just result.
44. Id. at 718, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
45. Schner, 286 A.D.2d at 719, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
The general principal of the spontaneous-exclamation rule is based on
the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical
shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control so that the utterance which
then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Id. The court also noted the test that governs the spontaneous exclamation
exception is "whether the declarations are shown to have been uttered
spontaneously so that the declarant obviously had no time or opportunity to
fabricate." Id.
46. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 361, at 326 (10th ed.
1973) ("As a general rule witnesses must testify to facts and not to their
opinions and conclusions drawn from the facts. It is the sole province of the
jury to draw inferences from facts."). However, the opinion rule is subject to
numerous exceptions. Sometimes, there is simply no other way for the witness
to explain the results of his observations. See, e.g., Collins v. New York
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., 109 N.Y. 243, 16 N.E. 50 (1888); People
v. Eastwood, 14 N.Y. 562 (1856) (holding that lay witness may testify that in
his opinion, the subject looked drunk).
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New York should follow the federal model since the
elimination of the term res gestae properly focuses the inquiry
towards specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. This focus is
especially important when dealing with an agent's out-of-court
statement. Determining whether the statement was made within
the scope of the agent's authority to make the statement is an
entirely different matter than determining when a statement was
made as is the case of a spontaneous exclamation.
As Professor Wigmore observed, the term res gestae has often
been employed to define the limits of the spontaneous declaration
exception and has also been incorrectly used to designate the
scope of the agent's authority. 47 As a result, spontaneous
exclamations are sometimes discussed together with admissions
"as if they were but one principle." 48 However, the results of the
application of the two principles are very different: spontaneous
exclamations may be received against either party while an
49
agent's admission can be received only against the employer.
The confusion caused by the dual use of the phrase "res gestae"
is apparent in several New York cases.
For example, in the often-cited case of Luby v. Hudson River
R.R. Co.,50 the trial court admitted a policeman's testimony
consisting of a statement made to him by the driver of the
railroad car. The police officer testified that the driver told him
that he could not stop the car because the brakes were out of
order. In holding the statement inadmissible, the New York
Court of Appeals discussed res gestae and admissions together
and stated that:
The declarations of an agent ... do not in general bind the
principal. Where his acts will bind, his statement and admissions
respecting the subject matter of those acts will also bind the
47. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078.
48. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078. Wigmore went on to say: "That

there are two distinct and unrelated principles involved must be apparent; and
the sooner the courts insist on keeping them apart, the better for the intelligent
development of the law of evidence." WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078. See,
e.g., Luby v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 17 N.Y. 131 (1858).
49. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078.
50. 17 N.Y. 131 (1858).
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principal if made at the same time and so that they constitute part
of the res gestae.... They must be made, not only during the
continuance of the agency, but in regard to a transaction
51
depending at the very time.
Accordingly, the statement was not a part of the driver's act for
52
which the defendant was sued.

II. EMPLOYEES' ADMISSIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES
A. Origins
While the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate the traditional
"speaking authority" exception, 53 the rules depart from the
common law by providing that a statement by an agent may also
be admissible if it concerns "a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment and [is] made during the existence of the
relationship." 54 Thus, for example, in Staheli v. University of
Mississippi,55 a university professor seeking redress for the
denial of his tenure application, sought to introduce a colleague's
statements. The statements by the colleague were that the
professor's prior actions 5 6 resulted in animosity between the

professor and the university resulting in tenure not being
granted. 57 The Staheli court held that because the declarant was

51. Id.

52. Id. at 133. The declaration was "not made at the time of the act, so as
to give it quality and character." Id. In addition, the court of appeals treated
the driver's statement as both an excuse for his actions and as an effort to place
the blame on his principals. Id.
53. FED R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(C) excludes from the definition of hearsay "a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning
the subject." Id.
54. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
55. 854 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 122.
57. Id. at 127. "Dr. Staheli sought to introduce Ithel statement as a nonhearsay admission of a party-opponent under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D)." Id.
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not involved in the tenure decision, the matter was not within the
58
scope of the declarant's agency relationship.
The addition of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) reflects increased
dissatisfaction with the common law rule. 59 Strict application of
the "speaking authority" requirement often led to the exclusion of
helpful and valuable evidence. 60 The decisions in Martin v.
62
Savage Truck Line 61 and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller
assisted in the development of rule 801(d)(2)(D). In Martin. the
driver of a truck, deceased at the time of trial, told a police
officer that he was speeding when the accident occurred.63 Under
the traditional common law rule, the driver's admission would
have been excluded because he did not have the authority to make
such a statement. However, Judge Morris, writing for the
District Court in the District of Columbia, held that the statement
was admissible as an admission against the employer.
To say

. . .

that the owner of a motor truck may constitute a

person his agent for the purpose of the operation of such
truck.

. .

and to say at the same time that such operator is no

longer the agent of such owner when an accident occurs, for the
purpose of truthfully relating the facts concerning the occurrence
to an investigating police officer . . . seems to me to erect an
untenable fiction . . . .It is almost like saying that a statement

against interest in the instant case could only have been made had
the truck been operated by an officer or the board of directors of
the [c]orporation owning the truck; and trucks are not operated
that way .... [The agency] exists regardless of whether the

statement is made at the moment of the impact, or some minutes
later to an investigating officer ....64
58. Id. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to admit the
statement.
59. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee's note.
60. Id.
61. 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
62. 292 F.2d 775 (D.C.Cir. 1961).
63. Martin, 121 F.Supp. at 418.
64. Id. at 419. This isalso acknowledged inthe advisory committee's note
to Rule 801(d)(2)(D). "[Flew principals employ agents for the purpose of
making damaging statements." FED. R. EvID 801 (d)(2)(D) advisory
committee's note.
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This holding was soon followed by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
v. Tuller.65 In KLM, an airplane's radio operator told an
inspector, eight to ten hours after the crash, that he did not send
a distress message because "[he] first [thought] of [his] skin and
then of the microphone." 66 Judge Burger upheld the receipt of
the admission. He first noted that the radio operator was an
employee of KLM when he made the statement in question. It
was also the operator's duty to report to the Inspector of
Accidents after the crash. Thus, consistent with Proposed Model
Code of Evidence rule 508,67 the statement "concerned a matter
within the scope of the declarant's employment," since he could
have sent the mayday signal had he been at his post. An
explanation of his failure to send the signal was well within the
scope of his duties.
In so ruling, Judge Burger noted the deficiencies of an
application of the res gestae analysis. Had the operator made the
same statement, within the hearing of another passenger upon
emerging from the plane, the passenger would be permitted to
testify as to what he heard as part of the res gestae. However,
this testimony could very well come several years after the event.
This recollection is less reliable than the operator's statement
which was made within hours of the crash, and recorded in a
formal reporting to Irish authorities. To have excluded the
operator's statement would have been to prefer "the weaker over
68
the stronger evidence."

65. KLM, 292 F.2d at 784 (citing Martin v. Savage Truck, 121 F. Supp.
417 (1954)).
66. Id. at 783.

67. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 508(a) (1942). This rule provides in
relevant part: "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible against a party
to the action if the judge finds that the declaration concerned a matter within
the scope of an agency or employment of the declarant for the party and was
made before the termination of the agency or employment." Id.
68. KLM, 292 F.2d at 783.
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B. Application of the CurrentFederalRule

In order for the out-of-court statement of an agent to be
admissible, normally the moving party must establish "(1) the
existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the statement was

made during the course of the relationship, and (3) that it relates
to a matter within the scope of the agency."

69

If these elements

are met, the out-of-court statement may be used to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. However, just as under the common law
rule, the statement to be introduced cannot itself be used to prove
70
the existence of the agency relationship.
The question of whether these elements have been met is still
governed by the law of agency. 7 1 In determining whether an

agency relationship exits, the federal courts look to various
formulations of the common law "control test."' 72 Whether
certain conduct falls within the scope of employment is governed
by section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 73 For
69. Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n, 963 F.2d 535, 537 (2d
Cir. 1992).
70. Id. at 538. See U.S. v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1117 (2d Cir. 1974).
71. See Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1038 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that
the absence in the Federal Rules of Evidence of definitions of the terms
"agent," "servant," and "scope of employment" is evidence of Congress'
intent that common law agency principals should be applied).
72. Sabel v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Mass.
1990).
An agency relationship has three essential characteristics: 1) the power
of the agent to alter the legal relationships between the principal and
third parties and the principal and himself; 2) the existence of a
fiduciary relationship toward the principal with respect to matters within
the scope of the agency; and 3) the right of the principal to control the
agent's conduct with respect to matters within the scope of the agency.
Id. See United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12-14 (1957).
73. See Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo, 458 F. Supp. 110, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 states:
In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is
nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be
within the scope of employment, the following matters of fact are to be
considered: (a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such
servants; (b) the time, place and purpose of the act; (c) the previous
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example, statements by attorneys concerning a matter within the
scope of theit employment are often received as admissions under
801(d)(2)(D). 74
Under the traditional common law, internal statements to the
principal were not considered admissions. 75 In this respect, the
federal rule departs from the common law by permitting such
76
statements to be received as admissions against the employer.
Rule 801(d)(2)(D), further extends the common law admissions
doctrine to situations in which the agent does not have the

relations between the master and the servant; (d)the extent to which the
business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e)
whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if
within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant; (f) whether
or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done; (g)
the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; (h)
whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been
furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the extent of departure from
the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and (j)
whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 229 (1957).

74. See, e.g., Harris v. Steelweld Equip., 869 F.2d 396, 403 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding that statements made by appellant's workers' compensation
attorney to his expert witness admissible); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1984). But see Blanchard v. People's Bank, 844 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.
1988).
75. See, e.g., Dilley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 327 F.2d 249, 251
(6th Cir. 1964) ("The mere fact that a railroad requires an employee to make a
report to it of an accident is not sufficient to cause the report to become
binding upon the railroad as its own statement."); see Nuttall v. Reading Co.,
235 F.2d 546, 550 (3d Cir. 1956); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency
§,287 which states that: "Statements by an agent to the principal or to another
agent of the principal are not admissible against the principal as admissions;
such statements may be admissible in evidence under other rules of evidence."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 287 (1957). But see Chicago, St.
Paul., Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F.2d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1939).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S.
1 (1985); Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1221 (4th
Cir. 1983); Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., 588 F.2d 626,
630 (8th Cir. 1978).
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authority to make damaging statements, but merely the authority
to "take action about which the statements relate."

77

There is nothing in the plain language of the statute that
requires that the admission be based on personal knowledge. 78 In
fact, the Advisory Committee stated that this omission was
intentional. 79 The absence of a formal requirement of personal
knowledge has been severely criticized by Judge Weinstein of the
80
Second Circuit.
According to Judge Weinstein, "[g]ossip does not become

reliable merely because it .is heard in an office rather than a
home." 81 The fact that the agent repeats statements that he has
heard does not eliminate any of the evils that the hearsay rule has
traditionally guarded against. This is especially true when dealing

with intra-company reports. "[E]ven an employee well-disposed
towards his employer may report rumors he has heard, not
because of their truth, but because his employer may be
interested in the fact that there are rumors." ' 82 This is a classic
77. Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n, 963 F.2d 535, 538 (2d
Cir. 1992).
78. See generally Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 893
F.2d 411 (lst Cir. 1990).
79. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note provides in
relevant part:
No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission.
The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of
searching for an assurance of trustworthiness in some against-interest
circumstance, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and
the rule requiring firsthand knowledge, when taken with the apparently
prevalent satisfaction with the results, calls for generous treatment of
this avenue to admissibility.
Id.
80. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 298
and 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 277-80. But see Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival
and Research Ctr., 588 F.2d at 626 (8th Cir. 1978).
81. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, 801(d)(2)(D)[011, at 298.
82. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, at 278. Judge Weinstein also
doubts the argument that the employee would not spread gossip out of fear of
losing his job, pointing to the fact that we live in an "era of widespread
unionization." Rather, he believes that it is a "fact of human nature that
rumor, unsubstantiated by fact, is at all times widespread and virulent."
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, at 279.
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problem of hearsay upon hearsay or "double hearsay." Judge
Weinstein wrote that this is only allowed, as required by Rules
40383 and 805,84 if both statements "conform to the requirements
85
of a hearsay exception."
C. Rationale of 801 (d)(2)(D)

1. Reliability
If an utterance is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, it would be hearsay, unless it fits
into a -hearsay exception. The hearsay exceptions under the
federal rules are often justified in terms of reliability. 86 While
there is no express requirement of personal knowledge under rule
801(d)(2)(D), employees' admissions are often received based on
their purported reliability. Not only is the statement usually made
shortly after the event, it is also often adverse to the interests of
both the declarant and his employer. These admissions however,
should not be confused with "declarations against interest. "87
83. FED. R. EvlD. 403. This rule states: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
84. FED. R. EVID. 805. This rule states: "Hearsay included within hearsay
is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." Id.
85. WEiNsTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, at 279-80. See, e.g., Rule 805
advisory committee's note which states:
[A] hospital record might contain an entry of the patient's age based on
information furnished by his wife. The hospital record would qualify as
a regular entry except that the person who furnished the information was
not acting in the routine of the business. However, her statement
independently qualifies as a statement of pedigree (if she is unavailable)
or as a statement made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, and
hence each link in the chain falls under sufficient assurances.
FED. R. Evim. 805 advisory committee's note.
86. See FED. R. EvID 803 advisory committee's note.
87. An "admission" is distinct from a "declaration against interest" in that
it must be made by a party to the litigation as opposed to an "assertion by an
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In KLM, for example the utterance was adverse to the
operator's personal interest since it could have resulted in the loss
of his job, impairment of future employment, and even the

possibility of criminal sanctions. Thus, the employee was very
careful as to what he said. 88 Of course, in order for the statement
to be reliable, it must still be made during the existence of the

employment or agency.89 Additionally, since the statement must
concern a matter within the scope of the declarant's employment,
the declarant is likely to be well-informed. 90
2. The Adversary System
While admissions are often reliable, 9 1 the party-admissions
exception is best justified as being consistent with the adversary
out-of court declarant." Moreover, an "admission" is not subject to review
under Rule 804(b)(3) and must be "adverse to a party's case at the time of
introduction at trial." "Declarations against interest" which satisfy the
admissibility requirements under Rule 804(b)(3) "must have had adverse
consequences for the declarant at the time of its utterance." WEISSENBERGER'S
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY

AND AUTHORITY § 804.21, at 514-15 (1987); See MCCORMICK, supra note 5,

§ 263, at 777; see also Shea v. City of Honolulu, 692 P.2d 1158, 1165 (Haw.
1985); Kekua v. Kaiser, 601 P.2d 364, 370 n.3 (Haw. 1979) ("[P]arty
admissions, unlike statements against interest, need not have been against the
declarant's interest when made, need not be based on the declarant's personal
knowledge, may be in the form of an opinion, and are admissible at trial
regardless of whether the declarant is unavailable.").
88. See Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1981).
89. MCCORMICK, supra, note 5, § 267, at 788 ("[Employee's] statements
offered against the employer are normally against the employer's interest, and
while the employment continues, the employee is not likely to make statements
unless they are true."). See, e.g., Japanese Elec. Antitrust Litig., Zenith Radio
Corp. v Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 300 (1979); United States
v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1979); Securities & Exchange
Comm'n v. Geon, 531 F.2d 39, 43 n.3 (1976).
90. Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n, 963 F.2d 535, 537 (2d
Cir. 1992).
91. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 239, at 503 (1954) ("This notion that it does not lie in the opponent's mouth
to question the trustworthiness of his own declarations is an expression of
feeling rather than logic but it is an emotion so universal that it may stand for a
reason.").
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to

Wigmore,

249
a

party's

admission has a special value when it is used against him, since
the admission acts to discredit the party's position. 9 3 The rule
against hearsay normally requires that out-of-court statements be

subject to cross-examination. However, since the admission is a

party's own extra-judicial statement, "[the statement] does not
need to cross-examine [it]self [at that time]."94 Once in court, the
party "now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on
the stand and explain his former assertion." 9 5 Admissions are
free from the usual demands of trustworthiness and may thus be

received even when they are not based on personal knowledge. 9 6

The doctrine of respondeatsuperior renders the principal liable

for wrongs committed by agents while carrying out their duties. 97
One would then logically assume that the principal should also be
held accountable for an agent's statements relating to the event in

question. The employee's statement should be treated as if the
employer had made it himself. This extension has been criticized

by some commentators. For example, McCormick wrote that
"the assumption that the test for the master's responsibility for
the agent's acts should be the test for using the agent's statements

as evidence against the master is a shaky one. The evidence
92. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note. ("Admissions by
a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that
their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than
satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.").
93. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1048; see also Edward R. Lev, The
Law of Vicarious Admissions-An Estoppel, 26 U. CIN. L. REV., 17, 29 (1957)
(stating that the receipt of admissions reflects "a judicial policy.., that one's
standing in court is lessened when he has, at another time, made statements
inconsistent with his present position").
94. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078, at 4.
95. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1078, at 5.
96. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, 801(d)(2)(c)[01l, at 27778; see also FED. R. EVID. § 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957) ("A master
is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment."); see also American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs
v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565 (1982) ("[Ulnder general rules of
agency law, principals are liable when their agents act with apparent authority
and commit torts.").
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should be tested by its trustworthiness."
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Similarly, Morgan

argued that "the mere fact that B has empowered A to do act X
for him adds no whit of trustworthiness to A's narratives about
X." 99 McCormick, however acknowledged that an agent's
statements are often reliable. 100
However, the attribution of an employee's statement to his
employer is justified by the current federal rules of evidence. As
previously demonstrated, there is no need to show that even the
principal's own statements are reliable. Professor Falknor once
questioned whether or not one should be able to employ a skilled
truck driver who may also be a careless and unreliable talker
without fear that the driver's "casual utterances made long after
an accident" will be used against him. 101 Yet fairness dictates
that in such circumstances, employers should be held accountable

for not only for what their employees do, but for what they say
as well.
If an employee has the authority to enter into contracts, the
employer is bound by these contracts. That a contract may be
98. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 244, at 519; see also Edmund M.
Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461, 46364 (1929). The article states in pertinent part:
[RIespondeat superior does not apply inter sese between principal and
agent.... It is only where the principal brings himself in contact with
the outside world through his agent or servant that he becomes
responsible for the latter's act. If the agent or servant in gathering the
data violates some right of a third party, the principal... will have to
answer for it. But where he merely transmits information to his
superior, it is specious to say that it is as if the superior were speaking
to himself ....

If such statements are to be received, their reception

must be justified not on any ground of representation but because of the
existence of some independent guaranty of trustworthiness.
Id.
99. Morgan, supra note 98, at 464.
100. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 244, at 519 ("The agent is well
informed about acts in the course of the business, his statements.., are
normally against the employer's interest, and while the employment continues,
the employee is not likely to make such statements unless they are true."). See
KLM, 292 F.2d at 784.
101. Judson F. Falknor, Vicarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules, 14
VAND. L. REv. 855, 856 (1961).
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formed by an employee's careless or uninformed statements is of
no consequence. In such cases, the employees words can bind the
employer. Statements concerning a matter within the scope of
employment made while employed should be treated similarly. In
fairness, he "who undertakes to create an agency relationship
should generally be made to reap the deleterious as well as the
beneficial effects of what the agent sows."102
CONCLUSION

A change in the current New York law of employees'
admissions is long overdue. The introduction of the term "res
gestae" is at best imprecise, and at worst misleading and
confusing. Moreover, the strict application of the "speaking
authority" rule has led to the loss of much valuable evidence.
The majority of states have adopted the principles manifested in
Rule 801(d)(2)(D), either by rule, statute or decision.103
Statements concerning matters within an agent's scope of
employment are often reliable. But perhaps the best argument is
one of fairness that is part of the adversary nature of litigation;
employers should sleep in the bed they make.
There is no need for the judges of the New York Court of
Appeals to wait for the legislature to enact a Code of Evidence,
since it is well within their power to change outdated law by
decision. For example, in People v. Caviness,104 the New York
Court of Appeals rejected the rule that although spontaneous
declarations made by participants in an event are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule, spontaneous declarations made by
bystanders are not. Writing for the court, Judge Cooke stated
that, "[i]t is time that New York abandon this unjustifiable

102. See, e.g., B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,
596 A.2d 640, 646 (Md. 1991) (quoting LA. CODE EvID. 801(D)(3)(a) official
comments).
103. See id. (adopting Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in place of a requirement that the
agent have speaking authority or that the statement constitute part of the res
gestae).

104. 38 N.Y.2d 227, 342 N.E.2d 496, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1975).
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evidentiary stance." 105 Such is now the case with employees'
admissions. In Loschiavo, the court felt constrained by the
doctrine of stare decisis. 10 6 Yet as Judge Fuchsberg wisely stated
in his dissenting opinion in Loschiavo, "stare decisis is no
obstacle to such self correction .... [A rule should not persist]
for no better reasons than that 'it was laid down at the time of
07
Henry IV.'" 1
David J. Waliman

105. Id. at 231, 342 N.E.2d at 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
106. Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1041, 448 N.E.2d
1351, 1352, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441(1983).
107. Id. at 1043, 448 N.E.2d at 1353, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (Fuchsberg, J.
dissenting). Se Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 86 A.D.2d 624, 628, 446
N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (2d Dep't 1982) (Lazer, J. dissenting) ("'Stare decisis' is
intended, not to effect a 'petrifying rigidity,' but to assure the justice that flows
from certainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers not
justice but unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to
survive.'" (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957))), aft'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983).
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